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ABSTRACT  ARTICLE INFO 
Introduction/Main Objectives: This paper aims to examine the
relationship between the quality of public financial management and
corruption in Indonesia. Background Problems: Despite the impressive
progress on the quality of public financial management (PFM) after the
financial reforms, Indonesia is still struggling to combat corruption. This
raises the question of the effectiveness of the public financial reforms that
have been carried out in support of the eradication of corruption.
Novelty: This study found empirical evidence of a significant long-run
and causal relationship between the quality of public financial
management and corruption. Research Methods: This study employs
panel cointegration and causality analysis with panel data on the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and audit opinions for the period from
2006 to 2017. Finding/Results: This study found empirical evidence of
the existence of a long-run relationship between the quality of public
financial management and corruption and can verify the significant causal
relationship between them. In the long run, sound public financial
management could significantly encourage clean government.
Conclusion: The Government of Indonesia (GoI) should continue its
commitment to improve the management of public finances. Meanwhile,
the Audit Board of Indonesia (ABI) is expected to strengthen its role to
prevent and detect corruption, and to continuously enhance its methods
and capacity to improve the execution of its duties and authority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corruption was accused as one of the cause of 
the massive financial and economic crisis in 
1997/98 in Indonesia and corruption, which was 
a result of poor quality public and private 
governance, the weak legal institutions and the 
lack of transparency and accountability, was also 
the reason for the government’s inability to 
restraint a deeper crisis (Brown, 2006). When 
the crisis occurred in 1997, Transparency 
International (TI) proclaimed Indonesia as one 
of the most corrupt countries in the world 
viewed from the rank of Indonesia’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI). Indonesia ranked 46th 
out of 52 countries, with a score of 2.72. (A 
perfect score is 10.00, for a totally corruption-
free country). Corruption was also believed to 
evoke economic distortions that were partially 
responsible for the economic crisis and led to 
massive riots and governance debacles 
(Macmillan, 2011). 
After the crisis, Indonesia committed itself to 
public financial reform to strengthen the quality 
of public financial management (PFM) and, as a 
part of its strategies for combating corruption 
(Macmillan, 2011), it established the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2002, issued 
the State Finance Act in 2003, the State Treasury 
Act, and the State Financial Management and 
Accountability Audit Act in 2004. The reforms 
resulted in a revitalization and repositioning of 
the role of public auditors in public financial 
management, by ensuring they could exercise 
their function of controlling the state’s financial 
management, through the issuance of the 
Supreme Audit Agency of The Republic of 
Indonesia (BPK RI) Act in 2006. 
After almost one and a half decades of the 
public financial reforms, the state’s financial 
management is heading in a positive direction, 
as reflected by the acquisition of audit opinions 
by the auditor. Based on the Audit Report from 
Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) RI (the 
Audit Board of Indonesia - ABI), in 2007 only 
seven percent of ministries and central govern-
ment institutions obtained the unqualified (Wajar 
Tanpa Pengecualian/WTP) opinion which is the 
best possible audit outcome. In 2017, the number 
rose to 84 percent. Regional governments have 
also seen similar progress. In 2007 only one 
percent of all the local government entities 
examined by the BPK received the unqualified 
opinion, and that number increased to 70 percent 
in 2017. Moreover, The World Bank in May 
2018 reported that Indonesia had manage to 
succeed in establishing a strong and reliable 
system of internal controls, accounting and 
reporting systems and procedures, internal and 
external audit systems with strengthened accoun-
tability and transparency. 
Concurrently, Indonesia still suffers from 
widespread corruption. Transparency Interna-
tional (TI), in their report of October 2018, 
stated that corruption is still endemic in all three 
state branches; judicial, legislative and execu-
tive. In early 2019, Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranked 
Indonesia as number 96 out of 180, with a score 
of 38 points out of 100, an increase of only one 
point compared to the previous year. This 
implies slow progress in curbing corruption. 
Moreover, according to the Indonesian Corrup-
tion Eradication Commission (KPK RI), the 
number of corruption cases handled by the KPK 
in 2007 was 113, and this increased sharply to 
514 cases in 2017. On average, the number of 
cases handled by the KPK increased by 26 
percent each year over that period. 
This problem of duality between the signifi-
cant progress in the public financial management 
sector, on one hand, and the prevalence of 
corruption in Indonesia on the other hand, has 
raised a question about the efectiveness of the 
public financial reforms that have been carried 
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out in support of the eradication of corruption. It 
is expected that a strong public financial mana-
gement system could be deterring and detecting 
corruption by reducing the opportunities for 
fraud; pointing out the potential causes of irregu-
larities, improving the rules and regulations and 
supporting appropriate disciplinary corrective 
actions against violators and increasing the 
opportunity cost of any misbehavior will also 
help (Dorotinsky and Pradhan, 2007). 
In addition, previous empirical studies in 
Indonesia on the relation of the quality of public 
financial management reflected in the acquisi-
tion of audit opinions for government agencies’ 
financial statements and corruption found that 
the audit opinions from the Audit Board of 
Indonesia (ABI) have no significant relation or 
correlation with corruption (Tehupuring, 2018; 
Rini & Damiati, 2017; Rini & Sarah, 2014; 
Heriningsih & Marita, 2013). 
Building upon this conflicting perceivable 
tendency and the empirical findings from 
previous research, this paper provides a new 
approach to seek and confirm the opportune 
relationship between the quality of public finan-
cial management and corruption in Indonesia. 
We investigate the long-run nexus and verify the 
causality relation between the quality of public 
financial management and corruption in 
Indonesia. 
The paper is organized as follows; Section 2 
reviews the literature on the link between the 
quality of financial management and audit 
opinions, and their theoretical connection with 
corruption, while also discussing the previous 
empirical studies into this issue. Section 3 
discusses the data and variable selection and the 
methods employed to answer the objectives of 
this research. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and a discussion of the results. Section 5 
will conclude the paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Linkages between Public Financial 
Management, Audit and Corruption 
Defining PFM is challenging since there is no 
uniform definition for it. Erasmus and Visser 
(2002) define PFM as the activities and other 
functions of public servants that allow them to 
determine the optimum way to use limited 
resources to achieve the stated political goals 
effectively. Lawson (2015) explained public 
financial management as the set of laws, rules, 
and systems and processes to allocate and 
distribute revenue and public funds, undertake 
public expenditure, and account for the funds 
and audit results. These definitions suggest that 
public financial management is related to the 
overall budgeting process, from the budget’s 
formation to its execution, accounting, reporting, 
and external audit. 
As part of the management process, auditing 
is a crucial tool for assessing the overall 
performance quality of the management in 
managing their resources. An audit is needed by 
stakeholders to measure the performance of an 
entity. “The benefit of an audit is that it provides 
assurance that management has presented a 
‘true and fair’ view of a company’s financial 
performance and position. An audit underpins 
the trust and obligation of stewardship between 
those who manage a company and those who 
own it or otherwise have a need for a ‘true and 
fair’ view, the stakeholders.” (PWC, 2017). 
Sukrisno (2004) stated that an audit is a 
systematic and critical examination of the 
financial reports that have been prepared by 
management, along with accounting records and 
other relevant evidence, carried out by an 
independent party who are able to give an 
opinion about the fairness of the financial 
statements. An audit should be carried out by an 
independent, competent and objective party. 
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Dye (2007) argued that an audit is useful to 
measure, report, and monitor a program’s 
performance. The output of the audit is a report 
that contains the auditor’s opinion of the fairness 
of the audited entity's reports. An audit 
comparing financial transactions is ca rried out 
according to set provisions, and reported 
according to the applicable reporting standards, 
so the opinion given by the auditor can be an 
adequate indicator of the quality of the financial 
management and the presentation of the 
financial statements. 
An audit’s opinion reflects the quality of the 
financial management of an organization; 
financial management that violates the existing 
rules and standards will be captured in the 
auditor’s reports. The degree of the quality of 
good governance in managing public resources 
can be assessed to what extend the financial 
reports has fulfilled the accountability, full 
disclosure or transparency principles (Safkaur et 
al, 2019). 
Auditors are the representatives of the 
public’s interests, they monitor and report 
managements’ compliance with standards and 
criteria, and they are expected to participate in 
the fight against corruption (Jeppesen, 2019). 
Corruption can be found in any environment 
where the holders and wielders of power have no 
accountability (Klitgaard, 2001). The absence of 
accountability will lead to corruption, and the 
relationship between corruption and accountabi-
lity is inversely proportional. An audit is also 
one of the pillars of the national integrity system 
to protect against corruption (Dye and 
Stapenhurst, 1998). 
Sound financial management is expected to 
support the prevention and detection of fraudu-
lent practices, the misuse of resources, and 
abuses of authority. Shihata (1997) asserted that 
a well organized financial management system, 
involving professional and punctual record 
keeping, auditing and performance supervision, 
is an effective tool to reduce corruption. Tanzi 
(1998) argued that strong auditing institutions 
are needed to discourage and detect corrupt 
activities. Moreover, Baswir (2000) said that 
through the development of accountability and 
transparency, opportunities for corruption can be 
reduced to the lowest level.  
However, Dye (2007) stated that although 
financial audits sometimes reveal fraud, they are 
not designed to do so and there is a high 
expectation for the supreme audit institutions 
(SAIs) to develop strategies to detect fraud, even 
though public sector auditors have a respon-
sibility, to a certain extent, to prevent and detect 
corruption. Meanwhile, Jeppesen (2019) argued 
that auditing’s role in combating corruption has 
been hesitant, so far.  
2. Measuring Corruption 
The legal definition of corruption varies from 
country to country, and the are some competing 
definitions of corruption (Johnston, 1996; 
Rothstein & Varraich, 2017) but the most widely 
cited definition of public sector corruption is 
from Johnston (1996) who defines corruption as 
the abuse of public office, power, or resources 
for private gain. 
The lack of consensus on the definition of 
corruption makes it difficult to measure. 
Corruption is also a complex concept of collec-
tive practices. Thus, corruption can only be 
measured indirectly. There are some methods to 
measure corruption. The most widely used 
indicator to measure the level of corruption is 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a 
composite index to quantify people’s impression 
of corruptions practices in public service. The 
CPI also measures a broad range of practices; 
therefore it can measure corruption with a more 
comprehensive approach. It is also a reliable 
proxy for measuring corruption because of its 
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robust methods and its ability to be compared 
with other proxies from time to time and 
between countries or regions. Nevertheless, 
since it measures only the perception of 
corruption, it is different from corruption per se, 
and perception can be affected by the political 
system, the degree of freedom the press have, 
and even income (Sharafutdinova, 2010). 
3. Empirical Evidence 
The empirical evidence of the linkages between 
auditing and corruption are presented by several 
studies. Farooq and Shehata (2018) studied the 
ability of external auditing to combat corruption, 
their study of private firms found that the firms 
with audited financial statements paid signifi-
cantly lower bribes compared to firms without 
an audit. Neu, Everett and Rahaman (2011) 
investigated auditing’s role on corruption in the 
public sector for the case of the Canadian 
Sponsorship Program, and found that fraud and 
corruption could occur within the public sector, 
even in the presence of seemingly robust 
controls. 
The independence of the audit and its 
integrity and professionalism could reduce the 
level of corruption in a country (Gustavson & 
Sunstrom, 2016) and this seems to be true for the 
private sector as well. The ratio of the number of 
auditors to the general population (Kimbro, 
2002), and the number of accounting firms 
(Malagueno, Albrecht, Ainge, & Stephens, 
2010) and the considerable requirements of 
financial reporting (Khalil, Saffar, &Trabelsi, 
2015) could curb the level of perceived corrup-
tion. In the meantime, contradictory findings are 
discovered by some studies carried out in 
Indonesia, including those by Tehupuring in 
2018, Rini and Sarah in 2014, and Heriningsih 
and Marita in 2013.  
Heriningsih and Marita (2013) studied the 
impact of financial performance and audit 
opinions on corruption in 13 cities and regencies 
in Java, for the period from 2008 to 2010, and 
found that financial performance (gauged by the 
independency ratio, activity ratio, and growth) 
and the audit opinion have no effect on 
corruption. 
Rini and Sarah (2014) examined the 
relationship between corruption at the regency 
level and the quality of the financial reporting 
(with the audit opinion as the proxy) in 
Indonesia for the year 2011, and the results of 
this study revealed that the quality of financial 
reporting improved, as indicated by the progress 
of the audit opinion’s acquisition upon the Local 
Government Financial Statement (LKPD) in 
Indonesia. The second discovery shows there is 
no relation between the opinion given by the 
Audit Board of Indonesia (ABI) and the 
disclosures in a district’s financial statement. 
The third finding shows that corruption in 
Indonesian is showing an increasing trend. The 
last, the disclosure of financial statements and 
audit opinions do not have an association with 
the level of corruption in Indonesia. 
The analysis of the impact of audit opinions, 
audit findings, and audit rectification on the 
level of corruption in provincial governments 
was conducted by Rini and Damiati in 2017. 
This research employed a panel data regression 
with 18 provinces for the period from 2011 to 
2014. The results show that both audit findings 
and audit opinions do not affect the level of 
corruption. 
The most recent study by Tehupuring in 
2018 investigated the relationship between an 
unqualified opinion and the level of corruption 
by employing the triangulation approach, which 
is a mixture of the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches where the quantitative approach used 
a correlation test, and concluded that from 31 
provinces in Indonesia, an unqualified opinion 
representing the good governance of a province 
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does not guarantee it is corruption-free, and this 
unqualified opinion does not significantly relate 
to the level of corruption. 
METHOD, DATA, AND ANALYSIS 
1. Data 
This paper employs panel data from 10 cities in 
Indonesia from 2006 to 2017. The first variable 
is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) taken 
from Transparency International Indonesia (TII) 
and the second variable is the audit opinion, 
obtained from the Audit Board of Indonesia 
(BPK RI). Table 1 explains the definition of the 
variables used in this study. 
The Corruption Perception Index is a compo-
site index of 32 types of questions related to 
corrupt practices. The 32 questions are catego-
rized into five main categories: prevalence of 
corruption, public accountability, motivation for 
corruption, sectors affected by corruption, and 
the effectiveness of eradicating corruption. The 
average value of the five categories is the 
Indonesian Corruption Perception Index score. 
In Indonesia, CPI data were taken from 11 cities 
surveyed by Transparency International Indone-
sia (TII) in 2006, 2008, and 2010-2017. The 
survey was chosen based on certain criteria 
(purposive sampling) to get a representative 
sample according to the specified criteria. These 
criteria are determined as follows: 
1. The Transparency International Indonesia 
(TII) Corruption Perception Survey was 
conducted in 11 cities in Indonesia. The 11 
cities were Pekanbaru, Semarang, Banjarma-
sin, Pontianak, Makassar, Manado, Medan, 
Padang, Bandung, and Surabaya, and North 
Jakarta. The selection of 11 cities was based 
on the following considerations: First, the 
provinces in which surveyed cities are 
located make the largest contribution to the 
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP); they 
account for almost 70 percent of GDP. 
Second, the 11 cities were chosen by consi-
dering the distribution of economic activities 
according to zoning or regional methods; 
namely the western, central and eastern parts 
of Indonesia. 
2. Referring to the city sample examined by 
Transparency International Indonesia (TII), 
this study only used 10 samples of the cities 
or regional governments that had obtained 
opinions from the BPK on their Local 
Government Financial Reports (LKPD) for 
the period 2006-2016. North Jakarta was 
deliberately excluded because the survey 
conducted by TII included public services 
organized by ministries/institutions which are 
central government agencies, while the audit 
opinion given by the BPK was for DKI 
Jakarta Province's Regional Financial Report, 
thus the CPI for North Jakarta is irrelevant. 
Table 1. Definition of Variables 
Variable Description Unit 
Audit Opinion  
(AO) 
Acquisition of audit opinion from 
the BPK after the audit has been 
conducted, to measure the quality 
of public financial management. 
 Unqualified opinion, ranked 4 (1-4 point scale). 
 Qualified opinion, ranked 3 (1-4 point scale). 
 Qualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph, 
ranked 2.5 (1-4 point scale). 
 Adverse opinion, ranked 2 (1-4 point scale) 
 Disclaimer of opinion, ranked 1 (1-4 point scale) 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(CPI) 
The CPI is an index number used 
to measure the level of the 
perception of corruption, as a 
proxy of corruption. 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is measured 
on a scale of 1-100, If the index is closer to 100; the 
level of corruption is low. 
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While the audit opinion is an opinion given by 
the auditor after examining the submitted 
financial statements using predetermined 
standards. The financial statements should 
provide sufficient evidence, and ensure adequate 
internal control systems and must be in accor-
dance with the applicable laws and regulations. 
The unqualified (WTP) opinion is the best 
possible audit outcome, followed by qualified 
(Wajar Dengan Pengecualian/WDP) as the 
second-best, and disclaimer as the worst. 
2. Data Analysis Method 
To investigate the long-run relationship between 
the quality of public financial management and 
corruption, this study employs econometric 
testing for the time series data. A panel unit root 
test is run to verify the stationarity of the varia-
bles’ data and continued with a cointegration 
analysis to confirm the long-run relationship. To 
validate the causality relationship for both 
variables, this study applied the standard 
Granger causality test.  
Panel Unit Root Test 
The empirical examination in this paper employs 
standard panel unit root tests such as: Levin-Lin-
Chu (LLC) test, Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test, and 
the Fisher-ADF test and Fisher PP test for 
nonparametric unit roots. Panel data increases 
the power of a unit root test on individual time 
series data. 
Firstly, suppose that the first-order auto 
regressive model AR(1) for the panel data is as 
follows: 
Yit= ρiYit-1 +uit                    -1 ≤ρ ≤ 1 
where uit is a white noise error term, and i = 1, 2, 
…., N is a cross-section series that was observed 
over period t = 1, 2,…., T. For any individual 
trends and fixed effects, ρi, the autoregressive 
coefficients, and the errors, εit, are assumed to be 
mutually independent idiosyncratic (individual 
specific) disturbances. If |ρi| < 1, Yit it means that 
the series is stationary. On the other hand, if |ρi| 
= 1, then Yit contain a unit root. 
In the case of a non-stationary series, 
running an OLS regression and hypothesis 
testing for ρ using the usual t test will result in a 
severe spurious regression; therefore we can 
manipulate this by subtracting both sides with 
Yit-1, to obtain: 
ΔY = θYit-1 + uit 
where Δ is the first difference operator and θ = 
(ρ-1). To allow for the various possibilities, the 
unit root test is estimated in two forms; with 
intercept: 
ΔY = β1 + θYit-1 + uit 
and with intercept and trend: 
ΔY = β1 + β2t+ θYit-1 + uit 
where t is the trend variable and tests the null 
hypothesis (H0) θ = 0 (if there is a unit root), and 
the alternative hypothesis, (HA) θ < 0 (the series 
is stationary). 
Cointegration Test 
Secondly, panel cointegration tests are 
performed in the case where the time series are 
non-stationary (at level), to determine whether 
the between-variables have a stable, long-run 
relationship (Pedroni, 2004). 
The basic idea of the Engle-Granger (1987) 
cointegration test is for when two variables are 
in disequilibrium in the short-run, but those two 
variables may be cointegrated (long-run 
relationship) if the error term or equilibrium 
term is stationary at levels I(0). Pedroni and Kao 
(1999) extend that Engle-Granger cointegration 
test’s framework for pooled data. 
The Pedroni panel cointegration tests consist 
of two types: a panel cointegration test and the 
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group mean panel cointegration test. The first 
test is based on the “within dimension” 
approach, which includes the following 
statistics: Panel-v, Panel-rho, Panel-ADF and 
Panel-PP. The second is based on the “between 
dimension” approach, which includes; Group-
rho, Group-PP and Group ADF (Pedroni, 2004; 
Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye, 2007). It is 
commonly accepted that the Panel-ADF is more 
reliable since it has better small sample 
properties than the other statistics. In the 
following regression: 
yit = αi + δit + β1ix1i + β2ix2i + ... + βMixMit + eit 
where t = 1, 2, ..., T; and i = 1, 2, ..., N; m = 1, 
2, ..., M; and assume that variables y and x are 
integrated of an order one I(1). The αi and δi are 
individuals, and the trend effects parameters, if 
desired, can be set to zero. 
Under the null hypothesis, the residuals are 
not stationary or there is no cointegration, the 
error terms, eit, will be integrated at an order one 
I(1). The method is to obtain the residuals from 
the equation above and then running the regres-
sion to test whether the error terms are I(1): 
eit = ρieit-1 + uit. 
Pedroni proposed several methods of cons-
tructing statistical testing for a null hypothesis or 
where there is no cointegration (ρi= 1). There are 
two alternative hypotheses, (ρi = ρ) = 1 for all I 
(homogenous alternative, within-dimension test 
or panel statistics test) and (ρi = ρ) = 1 (the 
homogenous alternative, within-dimension test 
or panel statistics test), and ρi< 1 for all i 
(heterogeneous alternative, between-dimension 
or group statistics test). 
From both the equations above we can 
construct the Pedroni panel cointegration statis-
tic ξN,T. The Pedroni asymptotically normally 
distributed standardized statistic is: 
కே,்ିఓ√ே
√௨ =>N(0,1) 
where μ and v are Monte Carlo-generated 
adjustment terms. Details of tests are provided in 
the original papers, Pedroni (2004). 
Causality Test 
Lastly, to confirm the existence of a causality 
relationship between both variables, the next 
step was to examine the causality test by 
performing the Granger causality test. It is 
important to note that the correlation between 
variables does not necessarily imply a causation 
relationship. The conclusion of a true causality 
relationship should come from a priori, a 
statistical test for causality such as the Granger 
causality test can only show “predictive 
causality” based on the assumption that one 
occurrence preceding another can be valid proof 
of a causation relation (Gujarati, 2009). 
The approach of the Granger causality test to 
the question of whether x causes y, or the other 
way around, to see how much the past value of y 
(yt-k) can explain the current value of y (yt) and 
then to check whether adding lagged values of x 
(xt-k) can help to improve the explanation of y. If 
x improves the ability to predict the value of y, 
then, x is concluded to be the cause of y because 
of Granger, or in other words, if the lagged x’s 
coefficients are statistically significant (and 
bidirectional causation is often the case); x 
Granger-causes y and y Granger-causes x. 
The models for the bivariate regression are 
specified as follows: 
 
 
 
n
i
n
j
tjtjitit uyxy
1 1
1  
 
 
 
n
i
n
j
tjtjitit uxyx
1 1
2  
For all possible (x,y) series pairs of (x and y) in 
the group. The F-statistics-calculated are the 
Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis: 
β1 =β2 = ... = βj = 0 
for each equation. For the first regression under 
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a null hypothesis, x does not Granger-cause y 
and the second regression shows that y does not 
Granger-cause x. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1. Panel Unit Root Test 
It is suggested to investigate the existence of unit 
roots in all the variables before proceeding to 
any econometrics analysis, to avoid spurious 
regression results, by employing the classical 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimator. Table 2. 
provides the result of the unit root test for with 
and without a trend term. From the results it can 
be seen that both variables are not stationary at 
level, but after taking the five percent 
significance level at the first difference, both 
variables become stationary in most of the unit 
root tests (except LLC test for opinion variable 
at the first difference by intercept). This result 
indicates that both the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) and audit opinions were integrated 
at order one, I(1). 
From the results we can conclude that both 
variables are non-stationary at levels, I(0), and 
become stationary in most tests at the first 
difference, I(1). This conclusion is important as 
a precondition before proceeding to the next step 
of the panel cointegration test, since we suspect 
there is a long-run relationship. 
2. Panel Cointegration Test 
When the series are integrated in the same 
order, one can proceed with the cointegration 
test. Table 3. shows the results of the panel 
cointegration test. 
Table 3 above shows the results of all the 
panel cointegration tests when the dependent 
variable is the CPI and the explanatory variable 
is the audit opinion. There are two parts in Table 
3 above, the first four tests’ statistics are 
computed by the “within” dimension (panel 
statistics) and the last three tests’ statistics are 
computed by the “between” dimension (group 
statistics). If the null hypothesis is rejected, then 
the CPI is cointegrated with audit opinions. 
From the results, most of the estimation results 
of the Pedroni’s panel cointegration tests 
indicate that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration can be rejected at the one percent 
significance level, for using either the intercept 
or the intercept with trend. 
Table 2. The Result of Panel Unit Root Test*) 
At Levels 
Intercept 
Variable LLC IPS Fisher-ADF Fisher-PP 
Opinion -7.41* -1.59 30.45** 25.37 
CPI -1.59 1.25 13.79 19.20 
Intercept and 
Trend 
Opinion -8.78* -1.06 32.79** 50.05* 
CPI -2.60* 0.55 20.35 55.11* 
First Difference 
 
Intercept 
Opinion 1.26 -1.69** 20.61** 78.02* 
CPI -3.78* -2.02** 40.03* 97.81* 
Intercept and 
Trend 
Opinion 0.96 0.00 16.05 81.86* 
CPI -7.3* 0.98 35.57* 08.65* 
*) Note: Levin, Lin, and Chu test (LLC), Null Hypothesis: unit roots and Im, Pesaran, and Shin W-Stat test (IPS) , ADF-Fisher 
Chi Square test (ADF-Fhiser), PP-Fisher Chi-Square test (PP), Null Hypothesis: unit root . The Null Hypothesis of 
LLC, IPS, Fisher-ADF, Fisher-PP tests examine for non-stationary items. **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
five percent and one percent respectively.   
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Table 3. The Results of Pedroni’s Residual Cointegration Test*) 
 Intercept Intercept and Trend 
t-statistic t-statistic 
Within dimension 
Panel v 0.30 -1.45 
Panel rho -3.05* -1.30 
Panel PP -5,73* -9.74* 
Panel ADF -5.97* -9.95* 
Between dimension 
Group rho 0.54 1.13 
Group PP -4.65* -6.13* 
Group ADF -5.10* -6.91* 
*) Note:  The null hypothesis is that the residuals are non-stationary, thus variables are not 
cointegrated. * and ** indicate that the estimated parameters reject the null hypothesis 
at the one percent and five percent levels. Newey-West bandwidth selection using 
Bartlett Kemel Cross Method Statistic Prob. 
 
This displays that the changes in the CPI are 
related to the audit opinion variable in the long-
run in those 10 cities. However, the results show 
a degree of inconsistency; some statistics are 
significant, but there are some exceptional 
results, such as the panel v and Group rho in 
estimation with intercept, and panel v and rho 
and Group rho in estimation with intercept and 
trend. Some of the literature says that in 
Pedroni’s cointegration test panel ADF and 
Group ADF are the most important, and in our 
result, both tests are seen to be statistically 
significant at α = 1%. It is important to note that, 
from an economics perspective, it is hard to 
determine how long a long-run is, but most 
economists agrees that a long-run is the period 
of time in which a variable may vary. In 
accounting, a long-run is mostly associated with 
a period of time that is more than one fiscal term 
(one year). To make this abstract concept of a 
long-run clear, the term long-run can be 
interpreted in this paper as the behavioral change 
of a public institution due to it having a regular 
audit. 
3. Causality Test 
The literature states that, with cointegration 
testing, if there is a long-run relationship 
between variables, a causality relationship must 
exist in at least one direction. In Table 4, the 
results of the Granger causality test show there is 
empirical evidence of one-directional causality 
between audit opinion and CPI variables. The 
result shows that audit opinion Granger causes 
CPI, but does not apply the other way around. 
Table 4. Pairwise Granger Causality Test 
Results 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
Audit opinion does not 
Granger-cause CPI 
7.75501 0.0009*)
CPI does not Granger-cause 
audit opinion 
2.68288 0.0750 
*) Note:  The null hypothesis is there is no causality 
between audit opinion and CPI respectively. For 
cases with probability levels lower than 0.05, we 
cannot accept a null hypothesis. 
DISCUSSION 
The results above confirm strong and significant 
empirical evidence of the long-run relationship 
between audit opinion and corruption level. This 
result vindicates the previous research done by 
Neu, Everett and Rahaman (2011), Gustavson 
and Sunstrom (2016), Malagueno, et al (2010), 
Khalil et al (2015) and does not support the 
findings of the studies carried out in Indonesia 
by Tehupuring (2018), Rini and Damiati (2017), 
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Rini and Sarah (2014), and Heriningsih and 
Marita. (2013). 
We argued that the competing results found 
in this paper and the previous studies conducted 
in Indonesia are due to the proxy variables 
selected for use and the methods employed. The 
proxy variables for audit opinion or corruption in 
the previous papers are suspected of having no 
stationary properties. The audit opinion, CPI and 
corruption cases have increased over time (time 
variant), thus the application of a linear 
regression (Rini and Damiati (2017), Rini & 
Sarah (2014), and Heriningsih & Marita (2013)) 
for non-stationary data could lead to spurious 
parameter estimations. The application of 
correlation testing with a dichotomous variable 
(binary variable or categorical variable) in the 
paper by Tehupuring (2018) cannot express a 
causal relationship. Moreover, a proxy variable 
for corruption with data related to the number of 
corruption cases arguably leads to a biased 
proximity. For illustration, in areas with high 
degrees of corruption, it is possible that 
collusion between law enforcement agents and 
the corrupt actors is taking place; as a conse-
quence, the number of corruption cases can be 
very low, even though fraudulent practices occur 
almost daily. 
 The result of cointegration and causality 
testing in this paper indicates that the quality of 
public financial management and corruption in 
Indonesia have a long-run relationship, and the 
quality of public financial management has the 
ability to cause future corruption; when the audit 
opinion is improved the corruption will reduce 
(the value of CPI is increasing). 
 The long-run relationship prevails as a 
result of the consistent and independent audits to 
prevent and detect corruption. In Indonesia, the 
Audit Board of Indonesia(BPK-RI) is equipped 
with the authority to prevent and detect 
corruption. Auditing has helped the GoI to 
identify the areas in which it is exposed to the 
risk of corrupt and fraudulent practices, and an 
independent audit encourages those responsible 
for internal control to exercise their duty and 
initiate the monitoring system to prevent 
corruption through feedback and suggestions 
(Jeppesen, 2019). Auditors are also in a position 
to prevent the GoI from issuing laws and 
regulations that would allow them to run the 
public office corruptly. 
 The detection of corruption by auditors 
also has a significant impact on the behavior of 
public servants, by deterring them from being 
involved in corrupt practices (Wells, 2002). This 
also encourages politicians to avoid committing 
fraudulent activities to avoid losing their elected 
positions (Ferraz & Finan, 2011), thus this 
discourages political corruption.  
The auditing of financial statements also 
encourages transparency and accountability in 
the management of public finances. An audit 
also effectively promotes efficiency and good 
governance and assists the GoI to improve the 
business processes of public institutions. In the 
long-run, consistent financial auditing will affect 
the attitude of public servants in their manage-
ment of the taxpayers’ money and encourage 
them to be more aware of how public money 
should be managed. Furthermore, auditing can 
create a constant vigilant environment that 
enhances risk and creates a lesser pay-off for any 
fraudulent or corrupt practices. Consistent, 
scheduled and systematic audits and controls 
also signal the GoI’s commitment to improving 
good governance and management of the public 
finances.  
CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, the quality of public financial 
management has long run effect on corruption 
level, through the process of behavioral and 
institutional changes in the public sectors. A 
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sound public financial management could 
gradually shift the attitude of public officers 
toward corrupt and fraudulent practices and 
encourage the improvement of standards, 
regulation, procedure and overall institutional 
aspects that can reduce the opportunity to abuse 
the power or authority for private benefit. 
Notwithstanding, the behavioral and institutional 
changes are needed to be further studied. 
Regarding that, as a recommendation, the 
GoI should continue its commitment to improve 
the management of public finances. The Audit 
Board of Indonesia (BPK-RI) is expected to 
strengthen its control and supervision function 
through improvements to the methods, capacity, 
and integrity of auditors, to enhance their capa-
bilities to prevent and detect any misconduct in 
the future. 
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